The UN must be reformed

In the first instance it is not a matter that things have simply stood still: it is the case that for the poorest people of the world things have got immeasurably worse, and the blame for that must go to some extent to two UN agencies, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This topic is outside the scope of this paper and readers should refer to such organisations as the World Development Movement for more information.

Since 1945 wars have gone on unabated. At least 30 million people have been killed. Vicious wars continue today. It has been beyond the power of the UN Security Council to stop these wars, but as this paper shows, it has been guilty of inaction when it could have acted to try to prevent war and it has been complicit in war crimes and crimes against humanity.  

Its failures with regard to the US/UK war against a desperately poor and weak country, Iraq, in 2003 have outraged world opinion and calls for reform are increasingly insistent. Kofi Annan acknowledges the intense criticism of the Security Council. 

At the time of writing (November 2003) an independent United Nations should be the obvious body to help to achieve a quick transition from US to Iraqi control of Iraq. Unfortunately the actions of the Security Council have created widespread hostility and distrust of the United Nations in Iraq. This hostility was caused by the malpractice of the Security Council and was entirely avoidable. 

Hardly a word of the UN Charter has changed in over 50 years. The document has proved remarkably wise in its ideas and rules, but a few of its provisions cry out for remedy. The most serious and most complained about problem concerns the composition and power structure of the Security Council. It is unrepresentative of the world as a whole and, contrary to the principles expressed in the Charter, does not operate on the basis of equality of members.  

This problem is thrown into the spotlight because one of its five permanent members, America, has a foreign policy today which is in direct opposition to many UN principles. It is vociferous in the promotion of its wars and the manipulation of the United Nations. Sometimes it claims that the United Nations and international law are an impediment to its freedom of action. It claims the right to act alone in defiance of the whole world. Its astonishing arms budget, its enormous stocks of weapons of mass destruction, its military bases in 56 countries, its recent history of bombing and subverting many countries, its current threats to attack a long list of countries including Russia and China, and its short term thinking are compelling reasons for us to examine its relationship with the Security Council and the rest of the world. The behaviour of the United States must not go unchallenged and unremedied by a world desperate for peace and justice. It is already challenged by terrorists: Osama bin Laden, for example, has raged against the crimes described in this discussion paper. There can be no doubt that these crimes have been a very significant stimulus to acts of terrorism. 

Again, Kofi Annan recognises the danger, “If nations discount the legitimacy provided by the UN, and feel they can and must use force unilaterally and pre-emptively, the world will become even more dangerous.”  - statement, October 2003. But hostility to United Nations’ principles and the rule of law is very rare. In the unreported debates of an open session of the Security Council, on 16 and 17 October 2002,  numerous national leaders spoke in favour of working within international law and avoiding war. Every country bordering Iraq spoke in support of this approach advocated by the French. None spoke of feeling threatened by Iraq. Further support came from the Arab League (with 22 members) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (with 57 members). Even the representative for Kuwait, which was so recently invaded by Iraq, spoke of compassion for the long suffering of the Iraqi people and the need to avoid war. There were demonstrations around the world against war on a scale never seen before. World opinion is overwhelmingly on the side of UN principles and international law, and against wars of aggression. So what is the problem? 

The charge is that the Security Council has lost touch with UN principles and purposes and has become a tool of American policy. To regain its credibility the UN must confront American power and carry out major reforms. Only through radical reform can the UN regain the confidence of the world. Only through an effective UN can the worldwide hope of security, peace and human fulfilment be realised.

Iraq and the United Nations 

The United Nations organisation entrusted the core responsibility for “the maintenance of international peace and security” to the Security Council, requiring it to “act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” But in its dealings with Iraq the Security Council has acted with scandalous indifference to these purposes and principles.

IRAQ AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1990 - 2003  

The Security Council has been associated with, or directly responsible for, massacre, wanton destruction, and an horrendous twelve-year sanctions programme which resulted in the deaths of over a million Iraqi citizens. Each of these is a gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council is guilty of failing to monitor action which it has initiated, failing to address the fact that crimes against humanity have been committed in its name, and failing to set up tribunals to try those suspected of responsibility for these crimes. 

When the war against Iraq was looming in 2002/3 it neglected its first duty: to recognise a “threat to the peace” and take appropriate action.  

After the war the Security Council condoned the aggression and the illegal occupation, the theft of a nations’ funds and the offering for sale of its assets. Its duty at the very outset of the war was to condemn the invasion in the clearest terms, and demand the immediate cessation of hostilities. After the US/UK had taken control of Iraq there should have been a stronger demand for the immediate return of Iraq to the Iraqi people, the setting up of a tribunal to try those who initiated a war of aggression, and unambiguous resolutions aimed at protecting the independence and sovereignty of Iraq.

Gulf War 1991 -  Massacre and wanton destruction

The Gulf War of 1991 was authorised by the Security Council with resolution 678 which allowed “member states co-operating with Kuwait” to use “all necessary means” to implement resolution 660 of 2 August 1990. Resolution 660 demanded that “Iraq withdraw its forces to the positions in which they were located at 1 August 1990” and thereby “restore peace and security in the region.” America together with the forces of thirty-one other nations achieved this, but in addition America took advantage of the situation to go on a rampage of killing and destruction  -  far exceeding what was militarily necessary to carry out the authorised task and being the plainest of war crimes.  

First there was the massacre on the Basra road. When Iraqi troops were out of Kuwait and retreating, they were bombed for 48 hours. In all, thirty to forty thousand soldiers were massacred.  

Second, massive attacks against the civilian infrastructure of Iraq were mounted. 227 thousand bombs were dropped on Iraq.  

Dr Eric Hoskins, a UNICEF advisor, reported that “eighteen of Iraq’s 20 power generating plants were rendered inoperable, reducing post-war electricity to just 4% of pre-war levels. Food storage facilities, industrial complexes, oil refineries, sewage pumping stations, telecommunications facilities, roads, railroads, and dozens of bridges were destroyed during the war.”       

The UN Secretary General sent Martti Ahtisaari, later President of Finland, to head a humanitarian assessment mission. He reported that the war had had “near apocalyptic results . . .  on what had been until January 1991, a rather highly urbanised and mechanised society . . .  Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age.” 

Article 52 of the First Protocol of the Geneva Conventions states, “Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack.” Article 54 states, “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, or remove objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.” Nuremberg Principle VI lists “devastation not justified by military necessity” under the heading War Crimes. American bombers were on a UN mission.

Sanctions became genocide

Normally, a country devastated by such a disaster would be a candidate for concerted action by nations of goodwill to bring the necessary humanitarian relief. Instead, the Security Council confirmed the continuation of the sanctions against Iraq. The new purpose was to bring about the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council set up a sanctions committee consisting of representatives of the fifteen Security Council members. The rules of the committee contained no safeguards that the sanctions would be administered in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. The rules gave power to any member of the committee to reject any contract requested by the Iraqi government for the supply of any item needed, with no obligation to give a reason. The Americans have by a very long way been the main blockers of contracts.

People with any concern for fellow human beings might well have worked successfully with this system, but the range and nature of the materials that were withheld from Iraq were astonishing. They included chlorine and aluminium sulphate which were needed to purify water; parts for pumps which were needed to provide irrigation, supply water and deal with sewage; paper, text books, medical journals, and computers; a whole array of machinery and machine parts including those needed to repair power stations; seeds, pesticides, fertilisers, and animal vaccines. By October  2001 humanitarian supplies worth  $5 billion had been put  “on hold” by the UN sanctions committee.  

The effect of sanctions on an already devastated country was catastrophic. Sanctions led to malnutrition and disease on a vast scale and the death of over a million men, women and children. Four to five thousand Iraqi children under five were dying every month. Former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, infamously asserted that the avoidable deaths of half a million Iraqi children was a price worth paying. By the beginning of 2003 sixty per cent of Iraq’s population was totally dependant on food aid.  

For years there were outcries about the effects of the UN sanctions. People devoted their lives to opposing sanctions. There were protests and vigils. Senior UN officials resigned in protest. But the Security Council and politicians in member countries ignored the outcry. 

When terrorists destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York in September 2001 politicians were at a loss to explain an apparently purposeless crime. A month after the attack Osama bin Laden made a taped statement on Al Jazeera TV. “What America is tasting now is only a copy of what our Islamic nation has been tasting for eighty years  -  humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrated . . .” He then spent some time describing the persecution of the Palestinians. He ended, “We do not hear anyone raising his voice or reacting . . .  A million children killed in Iraq, to them this is not a clear issue!” 

When British and American politicians were challenged on the effects of the sanctions they typically blamed the effects on the alleged misrule of Saddam Hussein.  They repeatedly asserted that the distribution of aid was hampered by failures of the Iraqi administration. These claims have equally repeatedly been refuted by UN experts in the field who had a team of observers constantly present to monitor the distribution process.  

Under Saddam Hussein before 1991 Iraq had been a first world country with a first-rate free education system. It also offered a free, quality national health service. As if unaware of the positive achievements of Saddam Hussein and the negative effects of sanctions British politicians claimed that the dire state of Iraq was caused by “Saddam’s appalling mismanagement of the economy.”  

Bearing in mind that the United Nations proclaims “faith in fundamental human rights” and “a determination to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,” it has to be asked how of the United Nations Security Council could torment and destroy so many people in Iraq in contravention of its core principles. Denis Halliday, former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, was not alone in describing the actions of the Security Council with regard to sanctions against Iraq as genocide.  (The definition of genocide includes “an attempt to destroy in whole or in part, a national group . . .  by killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”)      

Security Council galvanised into inaction 2002/2004

As already mentioned, the prime task of the Security Council is “the maintenance of international peace and security”.   Under article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations it is the duty of the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace . . .  and make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken.” During 2002 and the early months of 2003 the whole world knew that America and Britain were threatening to attack Iraq. (American intentions to overthrow Saddam Hussein had been publicly announced much earlier, in the Liberation of Iraq Act 1998.) They were working desperately against UN principles to make a case for war against Iraq. Verbal threats were issued on an almost daily basis. Tens of thousands of troops were moved into Kuwait along the border with Iraq. There has never been a clearer threat to peace. Yet the Security Council never once discussed what should be done with those threatening aggression and no member of the United Nations brought the matter to the attention of either the Security Council or the General Assembly which it was entitled to do under Article 35. The Security Council was completely distracted and hoodwinked by the US/UK frenzy of unjustifiable accusations against their intended victim, Iraq, and the challenges to it put by the US and UK to approve the war. 

In spite of the pressure the Security Council did not approve the war and finally said so on the eve of it, 19 March 2003. The French and German foreign ministers made excellent speeches appealing to the aggressors to abide by UN principles. The Council, in their opposition to the war, were belatedly following world opinion. Had they acted in conformity with their clear duty to oppose a war of aggression from the time that it was first threatened then opinion in America and Britain would not have been so swayed by the war rhetoric. Opposition to a war, already the greatest ever known, would have been truly overwhelming. Even British members of parliament would have realised that wars of aggression are wrong. The result of Security Council inaction was a war which led to the deaths of at least 37,000 civilians, the injuring and maiming of 80,000 civilians, the destruction of vital administrative records in ministry buildings which were specifically targeted, social collapse, and the inevitable destruction which is caused when thirty thousand bombs and missiles, including depleted uranium and cluster munitions, rain down on towns and cities.

Tacit approval of aggression

The day that Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 the Security Council passed resolution 660. This unequivocally condemned the invasion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. There should have been an equally unequivocal and swift condemnation by the Security Council of the illegal attack on Iraq by Britain and America and a demand for the attackers to cease hostilities immediately.

Authorising misrule

In contrast to this, Security Council resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003 gave mixed signals. It correctly stressed, “the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources” and called upon all concerned to “comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.” However, the remainder of the resolution did not support these ideas.

In effect it condoned the illegal invasion. The resolution accepted the setting up of a “Development Fund” to be financed with Iraq’s own money starting with one billion US dollars from the UN administered escrow account set up under resolution 986. This money came from the sale of Iraqi oil and was to be used only for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The Security Council gave away this fund, agreeing that it would be controlled by the occupiers “in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration.” (See Program Review Board below.) Additions to this fund came from the seizure of Iraqi assets held in foreign banks, including the personal fortune of Saddam Hussein, and oil revenues received since the beginning of the American occupation of Iraq. In total this amounted to five billion dollars by mid October 2003  -  expected to amount to nine billion dollars by the end of 2003.

America was thus free to use these Iraqi funds to pay themselves to rebuild Iraq and “for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.” In other words Paul Bremer, the American governor of Iraq, could use the funds more or less as he wished.

It was not the right of the United Nations to give away this money which it held in trust until such time as it could be used for the humanitarian relief of the Iraqi people, and it was not the right of America to use this money. Of the five billion dollars so far transferred to the American administration only one billion dollars has been accounted for and a senior UN official in New York says he has no idea how funds are being used. Four billion dollars have disappeared!

American foreign policy  -  create business opportunities by waging war

Within weeks of the invasion Iraq’s oil industry was in the control of the United States, being run by Haliburton, and there is no information as to how Haliburton’s services are costed and paid for. On 19 September 2003 Paul Bremer announced with order number 39 that 200 of Iraq’s State Industries and services including banks were to be privatised and available for purchase by any foreign investor. Iraq was to be made attractive for foreign investment by the reduction of corporation tax from 40% to 15%. All profits could be removed from Iraq. Such interference in the running of an occupied country is not allowed under the Charter of the United Nations or international law (Hague Regulations 1907). This is a clear breach of “the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources.”

Opportunities to give power to Iraqis avoided

From the earliest days the American Administration could have given substantial control to the Iraqi Governing Council which it set up, and the Governing Council could have been more representative of the Iraqi people by avoiding loading it with the Iraqi exiles friendly to US ideas and instead including within it representatives of the main power groupings from within Iraq itself.  

The so-called Governing Council could have been given real power, but it seems that it acts only as a consultative and administrative body. It does not govern. It has no power to spend money and it works purely as an advisory group to Paul Bremer.  

Even before the war had begun America was awarding contracts to some of its biggest companies (many friendly to the US administration, some being financial benefactors of the Republican election campaign) to rebuild that which was about to be destroyed, thus suggesting that America’s priority may not have been democracy for Iraq but profit for American companies. Is it likely that the Iraqi people would wish to enrich those who had destroyed their country?   

A commitment to democracy might have been demonstrated in its handling of these reconstruction contracts. Now these companies (mainly American) are working with their own personnel and are thus depriving the Iraqi people of employment and dignity as they watch the invader rebuild Iraq to his own designs. Through the Iraqi Development Fund the Iraqis are paying American big business to repair the damage caused by American bombing and paying for the illegal occupation of their country. 

How is Paul Bremer working “in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration,” as he is required to do under Security Council Resolution 1483? He has set up a Program Review Board, a committee to make recommendations on public spending. This committee has eleven voting members. Of these seven are Americans. There is one Briton, one Australian, and two Iraqis  -  one being the Minister of Finance who was appointed by the Governing Council of Iraq which was itself appointed by Paul Bremer. (He joined the consultation process in September 2003 after a great many decisions had been taken.) This committee’s recommendations are brought to Paul Bremer who then takes a final decision. This, too, demonstrates the American determination to control Iraq’s assets, and its opposition to democracy for Iraq. 

The Security Council is responsible for international peace and security. That is the beginning and end of its remit. It has exceeded its powers by meddling in the economic arrangements of a sovereign country. The arrangements it has authorised are illegal and may be rescinded by a new Iraqi government.  It is not entitled to give away, or sell at bargain basement prices, the assets of an occupied country nor to give its funds to an illegal occupying power to use at it wishes.

The American aim would appear to have been to privatise Iraq, gaining control over key assets, opening it up for exploitation by American and other global corporations. Once the new economic system has been established the Americans will hand over the administration of Iraq to the apparently free control of the Iraqi people. At this point Iraqis may find that their freedom to organise their economy and economic institutions as they may have wished has been wiped out. They will be faced with the disappearance of key personnel, the overwhelming difficulties created by sanctions, the war, the American administration, the privatisation of state industries, the takeover of their oil industry, and aid packages tied to contracts. They may may have no choice but to co-operate with American corporations. This is the likely nature of Iraqi freedom. 

UNITED NATIONS  -  THE NEEDED REFORMS

Lessons from the Gulf War

The events and actions described above show the following defects in the behaviour of the United Nations Security Council. The first is to do with how the United States committed gross violations of international law and acted outside the United Nations Charter in the way it conducted the Gulf War. The two problems here were the massacre of the retreating Iraqi forces, and the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure. We can see that the Security Council’s instructions to the forces it employed to get Iraqi soldiers out of Kuwait and the subsequent direction and monitoring of these forces were inadequate. Also, following the committing of momentous crimes there was no investigation, no war crimes tribunal, no holding to account. These major war crimes remain unacknowledged and should be dealt with. Those suspected of guilt should be tried.

The Security Council authorised the United States to run the war. This is not permitted by the Charter. Article 47, paragraph 3, requires that the Military Staff Committee (which should consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, or their representatives) “shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.” Whether or not the use of a Military Staff Committee would result in the proper running of the United Nations enforcement action the issue of the proper control of forces must be addressed.  

In authorising the attack on Iraqi forces the Security Council indicated that the forces should use “all necessary means”. These words are traditionally used when force is authorised by the Security Council. It would seem wise, in the future, for the Security Council to indicate more precisely what may and may not be done when applying force to deal with a breakdown of peace. 

The Security Council has never been entitled to unleash unlimited destruction in pursuit of bringing peace. It may only authorise force proportionate to the needs of restoring peace. Article 42 specifies that “ it may take such action . . .  as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” In addition, the United Nations is dedicated to the upholding of international law and therefore must treat with the utmost gravity the violation of international laws by forces operating under its direction. 

Recommendations

When the Security Council authorises the use of force it should specify clearly what may and may not be done. The direction of the use of force should be, in accordance with article 47/3, by the Military Staff Committee. It should never put overall control of a mission in the hands of a country with special interests in dominating or exploiting one or more countries in dispute.

The Security Council should monitor the actions taken by forces that it employs. It should investigate wrongdoing and in situations in which the new International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction it should set up an appropriate tribunal to deal with any international crimes. If it should fail to take appropriate action then the General Assembly should set up a suitable tribunal. The General Assembly must take upon itself executive powers to be exercised when it considers another body of the UN is unwilling or unable to take action necessary to carry out the work of the UN, or uphold the reputation of the UN.

A new Scrutiny Committee should be set up (see later) to observe that actions initiated by the Security Council do not begin to act against the principles and purposes of the Charter. This Scrutiny Committee would also act as contact point for nations aggrieved by Security Council actions. The Scrutiny Committee would assess complaints and issue opinions. It would advise the Security Council and draw to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly any matter which it believed needed their attention.

Lessons from sanctions against Iraq

Sanctions, as envisaged in the charter, were surely intended to be a firm form of persuasion consisting of such things as trade restrictions which might lower standards of living without causing actual suffering; halting trade in luxury goods; and restriction of diplomatic rights, travel, sporting and cultural exchanges.  

Recommendations

The Security Council should set up rules under which sanctions may be applied in order to ensure that the effects do not conflict with UN principles including that of respecting human rights. In future, sanctions must never be applied to a country in such a way that they put at risk education; the development of medical, scientific and other knowledge; the health, nutrition, and survival of a people.

The Security Council should monitor the effects of sanctions (and all other decisions that it takes), and take appropriate action when things go wrong.  

In the case of the sanctions against Iraq the Security Council or General Assembly should establish a tribunal to try those believed to be responsible for the deaths of over a million people. In future the new Scrutiny Committee (see later) should recommend the setting up of tribunals when it considers this appropriate. The tribunals themselves should be monitored to ensure that no country or countries have excused their nationals from prosecution (as has happened with the current Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague).

Lessons from the build-up to the war in Iraq in 2003

Failure to deal with a clear threat

The failure of the Security Council during 2002 and 2003 was that it completely ignored the threats of a war of aggression coming from the United States and Britain. It should have demanded and worked for peaceful ways of dealing with the alleged concerns of Britain and America. The Security Council is guilty of dereliction of duty.  A reform of attitudes, rather than rules, is required. Members of the Security Council must be alert to the hysteria and bluster of the United States, deal with any threats made by this or any other country, and not allow itself to be side-tracked by a country’s diversionary tactics.  

Resolutions as propaganda

Resolution 1441, prior to the 2003 bombing of Iraq, contained factual errors and misleading statements. These were then quoted by politicians as if they were pronouncements of unassailable truth. The resolution began by “recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security.” This seriously misrepresents the facts. Iraq was a weak and virtually defenceless country. It was known at this time that Iraq had no long-range missiles, that all nuclear weapons programmes and facilities had been verifiably eliminated, that at least 95% of the chemical and biological weapons had been destroyed, and that the shelf life of virtually all the remaining 5% had long expired. A possible tiny residue of chemical and biological agents which lacked delivery systems did not amount to a viable threat to even one country (a view shared by all Iraq’s neighbours). 

The suggestion of non-compliance and a later one that  “Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions” is seriously misleading. The remains of the vast chemical weapons factory at Muthanna,  partially destroyed by US bombing during the Gulf War of 1991, had been conclusively destroyed by inspectors. The Al Hakkum chemical and biological factory had been blown up by inspectors. Rather than noncompliance there had been astonishing co-operation by Iraq. Over an eight-year period 276 teams with 3,845 inspectors and weapons experts had scoured Iraq and systematically destroyed weapons, weapons materials, delivery systems, and related industrial facilities. Iraqi statements that “we have no more to declare” were known, even in November 2002, to be true or so close to true that there could be no international danger from any possible residue of weapons materials. 

Another questionable statement in Resolution 1441 is that “Iraq ceased all co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998.” This implies the fault was on the Iraqi side, when in fact it was the United States who withdrew inspectors making it impossible for further co-operation by Iraq at that time. Iraq was indeed reluctant to allow inspectors back, but there were good reasons for this. Shortly following the departure of the inspectors America, with help from the UK, antagonised Saddam Hussein by firing of 415 cruise missiles at Iraq and dropping 600 laser-guided bombs  - a flagrant violation of international law. Saddam claimed (and independent experts support this view) that inspectors had been used to spy and select targets for the bombing. Saddam then stalled on re-admitting inspectors as a bargaining chip to get UN sanctions lifted (thus showing more concern for the people of Iraq than the UN Security Council). He had a case which deserved a sympathetic hearing. It was not a simple matter of non-co-operation. The blame should have been directed primarily at the behaviour of the US.

The reference, in the resolution, to Iraqi terrorism was without justification. There was no evidence to support the idea that Iraq was working with international terrorists.

The threat in the resolution of “serious consequences” if Iraq did not co-operate was unreasonable because the Security Council had already killed over 1,000,000 Iraqis by means of the sanctions had imposed against Iraq. There could be no justification under United Nations Charter for inflicting more suffering on the people of Iraq. War, under the terms of the Charter, can never be an instrument of policy for the United Nations. That would be a negation of its prime purpose. Positive incentives like lifting sanctions, the offering of assistance and trade deals would have been an approach that would have been in keeping with the Charter. The concern of Iraq about the threat to them posed by Israel’s weapons of mass destruction should have been addressed. 

The misinformation contained in the resolution seems to have been intended to mislead world opinion. Resolution 1441 was used by politicians to sell the idea that it was necessary to bomb Iraq in order to get co-operation. Politicians quoted it as if it were an authoritative source of information, which it should have been, but was not. Resolution 1441 was written as an instrument of propaganda for war. Normal standards of civilised conduct require that communications should be fair, reasonable and honest. UN resolutions must be written with scrupulous fairness and integrity.  

Recommendations

The General Assembly should set up a Scrutiny Committee to scrutinise the work of the Security Council as it progresses, and deal with misdeeds and omissions.

It should examine proposed resolutions to ensure that they comply with UN principles, are consistent with international law, do not contain factual errors or misleading suggestions, do not make unreasonable demands, do not exceed the mandate of the Security Council and are fair, honest and conducive to peace and understanding.

When the legality of a proposed action by the Security Council is in question then the Scrutiny Committee should draw on legal expertise within the Committee or consult the senior legal officer of the United Nations. In the unlikely event of his advice not being accepted by the Security Council then the Scrutiny Committee should take the matter to the International Court of Justice in the Hague which should be authorised to adjudicate in such matters. Its terms of operation may need adjusting. All legal advice to the Security Council should be immediately published. If the Scrutiny Committee had the feeling that the Security Council was moving significantly in the wrong direction it should take the matter to the members of the General Assembly.

The Scrutiny Committee should publish all its recommendations to the Security Council and General Assembly and keep the public fully informed about its investigations and discussions on a daily basis.

The Scrutiny Committee would be a unique institution - a sort of synthesis of “conscience of the UN,” advisory body, watchdog, pressure group, political commentator and legal department (separate from but able to draw on the existing UN legal department). It would represent the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and work impartially in support of the ideals of the United Nations. Its method would be to issue considered assessments on the deliberations of the Security Council including even statements made by individual members or sub-groups (and include especially draft resolutions), issues it judges should concern the Security Council, and ongoing projects initiated by the Security Council. Assessments would be issued on a daily basis and some would have to be provisional. The influence and power of the Scrutiny Committee would be considerable because of its integrity, independence, knowledge and wisdom. Its pronouncements would become a focus for the world’s media.

It would be answerable to the General Assembly and world opinion which would undoubtedly be swift to criticise if it felt, for example, that the Charter had been misinterpreted. Hopefully it would work as a friendly partner with the International Security Council but its daily reports would stand as a counter to any propagandist distortions that might be made by a member country which sought to mislead its own people or the decisions of the ISC away from the purposes and principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations. It might, for example,  have been helpful and influential when President Bush announced that the war against Iraq was in support of the UN if a Scrutiny Committee had pronounced Bush’s statement to be totally contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

Resolution 1441 (and many more) begin with a series of hanging present participles  - recognising this, and recalling that, and stressing something else. For the purpose of comprehension these should be replaced by succinct summaries of the introductory material and be written in well organised, relatively short and clear sentences and paragraphs. 

Misleading presentation to UN